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Leveling the Playing Field and Reducing Fraud by Altering Incentives
By Luke McFarland
INTRODUCTION
In 1940, the Food and Drug Administration rst issued a labeling guideline stating that the term \fresh"
should not be used to describe products which have been subjected to heat or chemical processing.1 In
1964, the FDA issued a guideline stating that orange juice specically should not be labeled \fresh" if the
juice is processed into concentrate at any time before sale.2 In 1980, the FDA reissued its 1940 guideline.3
Still, orange juice manufacturers continued to use the word \fresh" to describe juices that were made from
concentrate. Some contended that \fresh" was part of their trademark and thus not subject to the guidelines.
Others thought that their product was \fresh" because it reached the shelf only a few days after the oranges
were picked. The reasons given were not important: the FDA never enforced any of the guidelines.4
In the late 1980's, Procter and Gamble noticed that the market share of its orange juice, \Citrus Hill Se-
lect", had started slipping.5 Feeling that their competitors were gaining an unfair advantage by calling their
from-concentrate products \fresh", Procter and Gamble contacted the FDA to inquire if such terminology
was allowable. The FDA replied that the terminology was in violation of FDA guidelines, but that at the
current time they did not plan on allocating resources to stop its use.6
In 1990, Procter and Gamble changed the name of its product from \Citrus Hill Select" to \Citrus Hill Fresh
1David Kiley, FDA Siezes Citrus Hill, Brandweek, April 29, 1991 at 6.
2Id.
3Id.
4Barbara McDonald, P&G Swears O the `F' Word in Wake of FDA's `Fresh' Campaign, Beverage World Periscope
Edition, May 31, 1991 at 8.
5Label Honesty, A Fresh Start, The Economist, May 4, 1991 at 28.
6Peter Barton Hutt, addressing students of Food and Drug Law class at Harvard Law School (January, 2001).
1Choice." They also added the phrase \[w]e pick our oranges at the peak of ripeness. Then we hurry to
squeeze them before they lose their freshness."7 The FDA objected to the use of the word \fresh", citing the
aforementioned labeling guidelines. Procter and Gamble stated that they would remove the oending word
if the FDA would impose similar restrictions upon its competitors.8 The FDA countered that they did not
have the resources to track down every violator and convince them to come into compliance { however they
maintained that Procter and Gamble would have to remove the word.
Procter and Gamble negotiated with the FDA on this issue over the course of approximately twenty months.9
Procter and Gamble argued that \fresh" was just part of their name, and showed surveys indicating that
consumers were not fooled into thinking that the product was not from concentrate. In addition to the
clear statements that their product was from concentrate that were already displayed, Procter and Gamble
oered to move the term \fresh choice" to another side of the carton and to add the phrase \means fresh
taste." The FDA maintained its tough stance, claiming that such additions would merely repeat the libel.10
Frustrated, Procter and Gamble walked out of negotiations on April 22nd 1991.11
Two days later, on April 24th, 1991, the FDA seized 24,000 cartons of Procter and Gamble's \Citrus Hill
Fresh Choice" orange juice from a Minnesota warehouse.12 Lacking the resources to go after every violator
of the policy and not wanting to show favoritism to the big companies, the FDA chose to hit a few of the
biggest violators. Procter \just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time," said Peter Barton
Hutt, a former FDA chief counsel.13 Agency ocials acknowledge they were looking for a visible target to
show they were serious about misleading labeling, and orange juice was a good one.14 The bold move made
7Label Honesty at 28.
8McDonald at 8 (\[C]ompany chairman and chief executive Edwin Artzt said, `We had previously told the FDA that, while
we felt we had done nothing wrong, we intended to drop the word `fresh' from our labeling, beginning in late May, given some
assurance that this would be enforced on all brands.")
9Id.
10Label Honesty at 28.
11Id.
12Pat Lenius, FDA Seizes Citrus Hill Over Fresh Claims, Supermarket News, May 6, 1991, at 121.
13Zachary Schiller and John Carey, Procter and Gamble: On a Short Leash, Business Week, Vol. 3223, July 22, 1991 at 76.
14Id.
2national headlines, and smaller companies soon got the message that the FDA would not permit the use of
the word \fresh" in violation of labeling guidelines.
Unfortunately, this FDA victory came with a substantial cost. Procter and Gamble, who had initiated
conversations with the FDA over the \fresh" language in the rst place, was hit hard. While a number of
producers (of juice and other products) were also in violation of the guidelines, only Procter and Gamble and
Ragu Foods were hit with the seizure. As a result, Procter and Gamble alone suered the direct economic
losses from the seizure, but more importantly they suered the bad publicity that followed. The FDA rarely
seizes goods, and particularly when the victim is a large company, such action makes national news and is
written about in major magazines for months to follow. Procter and Gamble's Citrus Hill brand, already
struggling to compete in the orange juice market, was damaged by the implication that its producer was
misleading its customers as to the quality of the product.
Procter and Gamble may not seem like the most sympathetic victim. However, the problem extends far
beyond a single multi-billion dollar company. First, the problem is widespread. The problem of insucient
FDA resources means that a number of rules and provisions that are on the books are simply not enforced.
Participants in various industries who report non-compliance or seek to authorize certain statements with the
FDA are often penalized for their actions by becoming the scapegoat for industry-wide change. The problem
extends beyond mere labeling requirements to every area that the FDA regulates. Insucient resources
mean lax enforcement, which results in unequal enforcement. Because there are thousands of regulations on
the books, but only a handful are vigorously enforced, industry never really knows how far it can go with
its questionable claims or fraudulent behavior. Industry therefore will be willing to \test the waters" by
placing claims on their product which explicitly violate FDA regulations, and waiting to see if the FDA will
enforce them. Furthermore, the issue is not merely one of fairness within an industry { it reaches to the
consumer level. The FDA's course of action in cases like the 1991 orange juice seizure will deter companies
3from bringing violations to the FDA's attention, as such companies are not insulated from FDA enforcement
actions (and in fact may be more likely to be targeted as the scapegoat). Because the FDA does not have the
resources to adequately respond to every complaint by a producer or consumer, reporting violations becomes
pointless.
In our capitalist society, companies either compete or die. In order to gain a competitive advantage over
rivals, producers are constantly attempting to push the boundaries of law. They characterize their product
as healthy even if it is not,15 they sell products that do not work as advertised,16 they use gimmicks and
advertising to boost sales, they put tiny amounts of food in huge containers. The United States has es-
tablished the FDA to monitor and prevent these sorts of behavior. Unfortunately, with inadequate funding
and resources, the agency's hands are tied { the FDA must choose its battles and as a result, many socially
benecial rules and provisions go unenforced or under-enforced.
This paper seeks to explore the problems illustrated by the Procter and Gamble orange juice example
provided above; namely, the peculiar side eects of inadequate FDA funding upon competition and rule
compliance. Part I of this paper will describe the problem in detail, exploring the FDA's resources and
responsibilities, their eects on competition and compliance, and the various externalities associated with
this particular issue. Part II of this paper will discuss ways in which various industries have attempted to
circumvent and supplement FDA regulation. One obvious but unlikely solution is to increase the resources
and funding available to the FDA. Some companies and industries have lobbied congress for special laws
or to force the FDA to regulate. Others have pursued false advertising claims under the Lanham Act,
tort suits against individual violators (for fraud, fraudulent inducement, negligence, false advertising, and
RICO violations), and suits against the FDA for failing to perform their duties. Many others have utilized
15e.g., until FDA regulation, Crisco prominently displayed that its product was \cholesterol free", despite the fact that it is
100% fat.
16e.g., the Fat-Be-Gone ring which taps into the \principles of acupuncture and acupressure," to create the same eect as
\jogging up to six miles a day," all with no drugs, no starving, no sweating." See Greg Winter, Fraudulent Marketers Capitalize
On Demand for Sweat-Free Diets, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2000, Sec. 1, Pg. 1.
4self-regulatory instruments such as the National Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau to en-
force truthfulness in product claims. While these various mechanisms have helped to solve the problem of
widespread disregard of FDA rules and to level the playing eld, they each have serious drawbacks. Lobby-
ing Congress is expensive, dicult, and uncertain. Protracted litigation suers from the same drawbacks.
Agencies such as the Better Business Bureau are willing to investigate complaints and violations, but have
no binding authority. These mechanisms have their place in the eld, but must be supplemented.
Part III of this paper proposes a way in which limited FDA resources could be used more eciently to
encourage industry to notify the agency of violations while simultaneously encouraging violators to cease
their oending behavior before formal FDA action is taken towards them or an industry leading scapegoat.
Currently, the FDA is willing to provide their opinion on the legality of any particular course of action.
For example, if you want to know if your company can use the word \lite" to describe a beer that has 200
calories, you can ask the FDA. The real problem is enforcement: if they tell you that this violates FDA
regulations, you may insist that your competitors with similar products also refrain from using the label.
But with numerous more pressing and important issues to deal with and a limited sta and budget, the
FDA cannot enforce every regulation directly.
My proposal seeks to alter the costs and benets of FDA rule violation by increasing penalties when ap-
propriate and making enforcement more likely, thus reducing the aggregate amount of rule violation and
leveling the playing eld. I argue that this goal can be accomplished without signicant increases in FDA
spending, and perhaps could even reduce spending and increase funding. Part III will describe my proposed
solution in detail, outlining its predicted eects on FDA regulation, its advantages, and disadvantages.
PART I. The Problem.
5The problem which this paper proposes to alleviate is illustrated by the Procter and Gamble orange juice
example described above. Essentially, insucient FDA resources result in incomplete enforcement of FDA
regulations. Those regulations that are of relatively less importance are sporadically enforced. This lax and
scattered enforcement creates holes, which players in various industries attempt to exploit in order to gain
a competitive advantage over their rivals. Some players in the industry may solicit the FDA's help to level
the playing eld by enforcing their guidelines. However, if the problem is not yet widespread it may not be
a priority for the FDA and thus scarce resources will not be allocated to x it. Seeing that the regulations
will not be enforced, the rest of the industry often must similarly violate the regulations so as to prevent the
rival from gaining a competitive advantage. Once an entire industry is violating the regulation, it often rises
to a sucient level to warrant FDA enforcement. Because the FDA lacks the resources needed to go after
every violator, they usually choose one or two industry leaders and make an example out of them. The rest
of the industry will generally fall in line after a move by the FDA.
As stated above, this frequently repeating scenario is problematic for several reasons. These will be described
in detail in the following subsections. By gaining an intricate knowledge of the forces involved in the creation
of this peculiar problem, we will be better able to develop and critique potential solutions.
a.
Insucient FDA Resources
It is widely recognized that the FDA is inadequately funded. The FDA is charged with ensuring the accuracy
and safety of approximately 25% of all consumer products in the market.17 Their duties extend to cover
17Agricultural , Rural Development, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, S. Rep. No. 101-84, (1989), reproduced in
Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Material, 2nd Ed., (The Foundation Press,
Inc. 1991) at 21-22.
6human and animal food, human and animal drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, nutritional supplements,
radiological products and use, and a variety of other areas. Yet in 1990, the FDA's budgetary allotments lag
behind other agencies with far more circumscribed duties. For example, the USDA's Food Safety Inspection
Service (FSIS), charged only with inspecting meat and poultry processing facilities, employed 7300 inspectors
and had a $417,000,000 budget in 1990. The FDA, which is responsible for the safety of all other foods,
had only 800 inspectors and an operating budget of $134,000,000.18 And while the duties of the FDA have
increased dramatically since its inception in both magnitude and scope, its funding has rarely kept pace.
For example, from 1979 to 1989, 23 new laws were passed that expanded FDA authorities. However, in 1989
the FDA had 800 fewer employees than in 1979 with which to accomplish their important tasks.19
The problem of insucient FDA resources is dicult to describe in quantitative terms simply because the
dimensions of FDA regulation are so immense. The problem can be better understood by consulting experts
in the eld, and is aptly described by Peter Barton Hutt, former FDA Chief Counsel, in an article in the
Legal Times of Washington.20 Hutt notes that in the 70's, the FDA generally had the resources required to
take regulatory action against agrant or industry-wide violations. However, as the scope and quantity of
the FDA's duties began grow faster than their resources, the agency was forced to \cut back drastically on
its regulatory activity regarding economic violations of the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act]."21 \Industry
requests that the FDA enforce the act's economic provisions have been met with a standard FDA response,
both orally and in writing, that the agency's limited resources simply do not permit enforcement activities in
this area."22 Hutt goes on to note that the FDA has forthrightly stated that it \simply will not enforce certain
18Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of Foodborne Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further
Suggestions for Reform, 53 Food Drug L.J. 681, 703 (1998).
19S. Rep. No. 101-84, (1989).
20Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Reduces Economic Regulation of Food Industry, Legal Times of Washington, August 30, 1981,
at 31, reproduced in Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Material, 2nd Ed., (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1991) at 1056-1057.
21Id.
22Id.
7parts of the act...even agrant and widespread violations have been included within this new policy."23 The
limited resources of the FDA have forced them to prioritize the areas that it regulates. \Our high priorities
are health hazards, lth, and nutrition. Our lowest priorities are food economics and food standards."24
Inadequate funding of the FDA is a persistent problem that does not seem likely to be remedied in the near
future { falling taxes, balanced budgets, and tight governmental spending will all prevent the type of budget
increase needed to make substantial improvements in FDA resources.
b.
Competitive Rule-Breaking
Another problematic aspect evidenced by the orange juice example is competitive rule breaking. \[T]he
FDA's continuing failure to enforce the FDCA's economic provisions invites serious problems both for con-
sumers and for regulated indiustry. Such a policy encourages less responsible manufacturers to aunt the law
and can force even the most respectable members of the industry to cut corners in order to meet competi-
tion."25 Competitors should not feel obligated to violate FDA regulations just to keep pace with their rivals.
Each player in an industry should be able to count on the FDA to prevent the acquisition of a competitive
advantage but a less scrupulous member in the eld. Furthermore, consumers should be insulated from the
fraudulent and potentially dangerous eects of competition-driven rule violation.
c.
The Role of Publicity
23Id.
24Agency response to National Milk Producers Federation opposition to its regulations regarding \imitation" labeling on
cheeses with substitute dairy products. Id.
25Id.
8A major factor in the problem as described is the role of publicity. This issue can be broken down into two
parts. The rst part deals with the role that publicity plays in the FDA's choice of \victims" for its limited
enforcement mechanisms. More specically, a major part of the problem is that it indeed makes a great
deal of sense for the FDA to attack a market leader in order to make big headlines. Smaller players in the
industry will get the news that the FDA is now enforcing a particular guideline and will quickly mend their
ways. In this way, the FDA need only seek to enforce regulations against a single entity and thus saves the
expense and time of seeking out and going after each entity individually. Major FDA enforcement actions
may even induce compliance in other industries, as leaders in other areas take note of the FDA's strong
actions in enforcing various guidelines. For example, the FDA action against Procter and Gamble in 1991
was seen by many as an attempt by Commissioner David Kessler to \draw a line in the sand" and \show
that the FDA's bite [was] worse then its bark."26
Unfortunately, it is this same publicity that causes the most damage to the company singled out as the victim
of FDA enforcement. Many commentators have argued that publicity should be used as the ultimate weapon
of the FDA { many big companies might be willing to pay the small nes associated with many violations
and continue the illegal conduct. The \dreaded publicity" is \the real punishment."27 But while fear of
bad publicity may be the main factor motivating compliance with FDA regulations, it seems fundamentally
unfair that one or two companies should be singled out to receive the \dreaded" punishment. True, the
persecuted company is certainly not innocent { but they are usually no more guilty than any other member
of the industry. Perhaps in accordance with their limited resources, the FDA is not required to enforce
regulations equally or across an entire industry.28Ideally, however, enforcement would occur across the board
26See David Kiley, FDA Siezes Citrus Hill, Brandweek, April 29, 1991 at 6.
27Arthur Kallet and F.J. Schlink, 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs (1933), reproduced in Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill,
Food and Drug Law: Cases and Material, 2nd Ed., (The Foundation Press, Inc. 1991) at 1194.
28See generally Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Material, 2nd Ed., (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1991) at 1045 { 1055.
9so as to avoid singling out a single company as a scapegoat.
Part II. Industry Eorts to Obtain Enforcement: a Partial Solution
Confronted with the problem of under-enforcement and uneven playing elds, innovative industries and
creative legal teams have attempted various methods to enforce FDA regulations. This section will detail
many of those eorts, ultimately concluding that while they appropriately provide adequate remedy in some
cases, they do not ultimately solve the problem at hand. Typically requiring the outlay of signicant amounts
of money and the assumption of great amounts of risk and uncertainty, these methods are no substitute for
adequate FDA regulation.
a.
Suits Against the FDA or Government.
Occasionally, various parties have brought suit in an attempt to force the FDA to exercise its regulatory
powers. The Supreme Court denitively answered the question of whether a court can review agency decisions
not to enforce a particular regulation in Heckler v. Chaney.29 In Heckler, several prison inmates petitioned
the FDA, alleging that the use of certain drugs for lethal injection of death row inmates violated the FD&C
Act. The FDA refused the request to exercise their regulatory authority. The inmates then led suit alleging
that the FDA's refusal was both reviewable and an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals for the District
29470 U.S. 821.
10of Colombia agreed, remanding the case \with directions that the agency be required to `fulll its statutory
function."'30
The Supreme Court granted cert. Without tackling the \thorny issue" of FDA jurisdiction, the Court held
that there was no judicial authority to review determinations by the FDA not to exercise its enforcement
authority.31 First, an agency decision not to enforce will usually involve complex factors which are \peculiarly
within its expertise."32 The agency is in the best position to determine whether or not a violation has
occurred, whether or not limited resources are best devoted to one violation or another, whether the agency
is likely to succeed if it acts, and whether the enforcement action in question best ts the agencies overall
policies. Furthermore, \when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over
an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called
upon to protect."33 For these reasons, an agency decision not to act is presumptively unreviewable. If the
particular statute establishing the agency's enforcement power makes clear the circumstances in which an
agency is bound to take action, failure to do so under proper circumstances will be reviewable by the courts.34
The Court here analyzes the FD&C Act and determines that its language is permissive { for example, \The
secretary is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations," and oending food, drugs, or cosmetics
\shall be liable to be proceeded against."35 The Court notes that the rare parts of the statute which are
phrased as mandatory, such as the section on criminal sanctions stating that violators of the act \shall be
imprisoned...or ned," cannot be logically interpreted to require such action in all circumstances.36
Thus, the Supreme Court has denitively answered in the negative the question of whether individuals or
corporations may sue to force the FDA to utilize its regulatory powers. A limited exception has been carved
30Id. at 823, quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191 (1983).
31Id. at 828.
32Id. at 831.
33Id. at 832.
34Id. at 833.
35Id. at 835.
36Id.
11out by a District Court in the Eastern District of New York { which has held that where FDA regulations
themselves establish a required course of agency action, a suit can be maintained for failure to hold to that
course of action.37 Still, this potential solution to the problem at hand has been all but eliminated. The
opposite holding by the Supreme Court would have been extremely problematic. Allowing private parties to
require enforcement of FD&C Act provisions would stretch the FDA beyond the limitations of their budget
and would be completely impracticable without increased resource availability.
Actions have also been brought against the United States for FDA failure to enforce, essentially alleging
negligence in the performance of their duties. For example, claims have been brought when the FDA
approved drugs that were later found to be dangerous,38 wrongfully refused to approve a new drug,39 or
seized perishable goods that were not adulterated.40 Courts have given the FDA wide latitude in their
enforcement choices, refusing to nd liability due to the large amount of discretion involved in making these
dicult decisions.41 As a result, suits against the government under these theories provide no solution to
our dilemma.
b.
Private Causes of Action under the FD&C Act.
For several years, many legal scholars believed that a private right of action under the FD&C Act might
be allowed.42 For example, if the FDA chose not to enforce a particular regulation, an injured consumer or
competitor could bring suit, and the issue could be adjudicated in court. With only a few limited exceptions
37Heterochemical Corp. v. FDA, 644 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
38Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
39Hogan v. FDA, 1965-1968 FDLI Jud. Rec. 376 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
40Mizokami v. United States, 414 F.2d 1375 (Cl. Ct. 1969).
41The Tort Claims Act prohibits such suits against the government for claims \based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty." 28 U.S.C. 2680.
42See generally Cole & Shapiro, Private Litigation Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Should the Right to
Sue be Implied?, 30 FDC L.J. 576 (1975); Sales, Does the FDC Act Create a Private Right of Action?, 38 FDC L.J. 501 (1973).
12that do not apply to the topic at hand, courts have held that the FD&C Act does not create or allow for a
private right of action.
Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co. is illustrative of this line of cases.43 In this case,
the State of Florida brought suit on its own behalf and on behalf of consumers and purchasers of certain
drugs manufactured by the defendant. The complaint alleged that the defendants had falsely represented
the eectiveness and side-eects of the drugs, which is actionable under provisions of the FD&C Act. The
court dismissed the action, stating unequivocally that \[t]he Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does
not create a private right of action." Section 307 of the Act states that all proceedings for the enforcement
of the Act shall be brought by the United States, and the legislative history shows that early versions of the
bill originally provided for a private right of action but that the clause was omitted after various attacks.44
Various other District Courts have similarly held that there is no private right of action under the FD&C
Act.45
In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,46 the Supreme Court held 5-4 that an allegation of an
FD&C Act violation as an element of a state cause of action could not be brought in a Federal Court. In so
holding, both the majority and dissenting opinions assumed that the FD&C Act does not create a private
right of action for individuals injured by conduct that violates the act's provisions. Given the unied opinion
of the courts who have weighed in on the subject, including Supreme Court dicta, it is safe to assume that
private causes of action will not be allowed to proceed under the FD&C Act.
c.
Common Law Suits and State Law
43329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
44Id. at 365.
45See Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Material, 2nd Ed., (The Foundation
Press, Inc. 1991) note 1 at 1218-1219 (collecting cases).
46478 U.S. 804 (1986).
13One legal option that remains open to aggrieved consumers or competitors is a suit based on common law
theories such as fraud, negligence, or breach of warranty. While the FD&C Act does not allow for a private
remedy, a violation of the duties imposed by the Act may constitute per se fraud, negligence, etc. Just as
many states regard violation of motor vehicle statutes as negligence per se, many states will regard violation
of FDA regulations as per se unlawful. Using the orange juice example which began this paper, Procter and
Gamble could have brought a state common law action against a particular competitor alleging that the
labeling was per se fraudulent because it violated FDA regulations.
Other state laws may also provide for remedies. For example, state food and drug laws may allow an
independent private cause of action, or there may be other specic state statutes that provide for remedies.47
While a state-by-state survey is outside of the scope of this paper, it is important to note that these remedies
are available, although inconsistent.
Reliance on common law remedies is problematic, and does not adequately solve this problem presented
in this paper. First and foremost, widespread enforcement against a number of violators is dicult and
expensive because individual actions may have to be led in each state in which a violator operates because
these claims are based on state law. Depending upon the state, a variety of dierent procedural and legal
requirements may exist. Furthermore, litigation is costly, slow, and risky. For these reasons, parties will
resort to litigation at a sub-optimal level { consumers will suer and competitive irregularities will persist.
d.
The Lanham Act
One of the most widely used methods of stopping competitors from making fraudulent or misleading claims is
47See, e.g. Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1983); National Women's
Health Network, Inc. v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 545 F.Supp. 1177 (D.Mass. 1982).
14a suit under the Lanham Act.48 The Lanham Act provides that any person who is damaged or is likely to be
damaged by false or misleading representations may bring a civil action against such representations about
their products.49 Potential remedies for violations include injunctive relief, damages, recovery of prots, and
destruction of infringing materials.50
The intersection between FDA regulation and Lanham Act liability can be dispositive in some cases. For
example, courts have held that a drug claim not approved by FDA { even if supported by scientic studies
and journal arguments { is false under the Act and hence actionable. In Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co,51
the district court under the Lanham Act entered an injunction barring Eli Lilly from claiming that its drug
Evista reduces the risk of breast cancer because evidence supporting this claim is inconclusive and thus FDA
has not approved Evista for that use. This type of per se Lanham Act violation would aid plaintis in some
situations, but would not apply in the paradigmatic case, where a statement violates an unenforced FDA
regulation.
The Lanham Act provides an excellent way for companies to force competitors to refrain from using false and
misleading advertising and branding. Still, it has deciencies and does not adequately solve the problem of
lax FDA enforcement. First, consumers have no right of action under the Lanham Act, only competitors.52
While it is unclear how signicant this factor is (that is, how often consumers will be damaged and willing
4860 Stat. 427 (1946). As amended by 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (1988), x 43(a) of the Lanham Act reads:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the aliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin of sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his
or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.
49Id.
50For a myriad of Lanham Act cases, see Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and
Material, 2nd Ed., (The Foundation Press, Inc. 1991) note 2 at 1233 (collecting cases).
51No. 99 CIV. 1452(JGK), 1999 WL 509471 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999).
52See Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly, supra note 43 (dismissing Lanham Act claim stating \the commentators
agree that members of the general public, as consumers, have no right of action under the Lanham Act").
15to sue without a corresponding damage to a competitor who is willing to sue), this wrinkle does open up the
possibility of unrecompensed damage to consumers. The risk, delay, and expense of litigation are signicant
additional problems that make suits under the Lanham Act imperfect substitutes for prompt FDA action.53
Moreover, a successful Lanham Act suit requires various additional layers of proof. For example, a plainti
carries the burden of proving that the statements are false or misleading (an often dicult task), and must
prove that they were damaged by the false or misleading statement. Thus, it is more dicult to win a
Lanham Act suit than it is for the FDA to establish that a violation of their regulations has occurred.
e.
Going Through Congress
Industry has attempted to utilize Congress to put pressure on the FDA to enforce certain regulations in
two dierent ways, with varying degrees of success. The rst method that has been employed is to pres-
sure individual congressmen to contact the FDA. For example, a large food manufacturer from a particular
state would convince one its representatives to lobby the FDA for some particular enforcement action. This
method of pressuring the FDA has been mostly unsuccessful. \The FDA has responded to congressional
letters on behalf of constituents in much that same way that it has responded to the food industry in gen-
eral."54
Industry has had more success forcing FDA action by going through the congressional appropriations com-
mittee. Another orange juice example demonstrates that industry can obtain favorable results by threatening
the already strained budget of the agency. In the Senate report on the FDA's scal 1981 appropriations,
53In some extreme cases, attorney's fees may be awarded to prevailing plaintis. This may reduce the deterrent eect that
litigation costs have on suits under the Lanham Act.
54Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Reduces Economic Regulation of Food Industry, Legal Times of Washington, August 30, 1981,
at 31, reproduced in Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Material, 2nd Ed., (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1991) at 1056-1057.
16the appropriations committee expressed concern that adulterated frozen orange juice concentrate and adul-
terated orange juice from concentrate were increasingly prevalent in the marketplace.55 The committee
noted that this trend was a threat to consumers and was \work[ing] an economic hardship on growers and
processors who produce a pure product."56 \The committee stated its belief that the FDA `should pursue
a rigorous enforcement policy with respect to any violations of the Federal standards of identity for orange
juice,' and directed the agency to submit a report of its plan for enforcement within three months of the
appropriations bill's enactment."57 The FDA quickly snapped to attention, bringing formal seizure actions
against 800 55-gallon drums of adulterated orange juice.58
Thus, congressional lobbying by industry can be an eective way to force the FDA to enforce certain reg-
ulations, leveling the playing eld and reducing harm to the consumer. However, this method has serious
drawbacks. First, only a few large companies will be able to spend the money and exert the kind of inuence
needed to convince key members of Congress to force the FDA's hand. If congressional pressure is the
only way to obtain enforcement, most companies will be left without a remedy. Furthermore, the process
is slow and cumbersome. Even for corporations that wield great inuence in Washington, relief will must
come through a tedious and inecient process. Additionally, the outcome is uncertain given the number
of variables involved { whether members of Congress support the action, whether the provision will pass,
whether the FDA listen to Congress, whether the enforcement chosen by the FDA will comport with that
sought by the industry.
The ineciency and inequality of the congressional route make it a poor substitute for adequate FDA en-
forcement. Congress is simply not in an eective position to micro-manage the aairs of the FDA. While
55S. Rep. No. 96-1030, at 100 (1980).
56Id.
57Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Reduces Economic Regulation of Food Industry, Legal Times of Washington, August 30, 1981,
at 31, reproduced in Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Material, 2nd Ed., (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1991) at 1056-1057; quoting S. Rep. No. 96-1030, at 100 (1980).
58Id.
17this route certainly is an eective way for some large companies to exercise their political clout and obtain
some measure of competitive \equality" in their industry, it must certainly be augmented by other methods.
f.
The Better Business Bureau
Perhaps the most interesting industry development helping to alleviate the problem of FDA under-funding
and under-enforcement is the Better Business Bureau (BBB). The BBB was founded in 1912, and today is
supported by 250,000 local business members nationwide.59 The BBB is \[d]edicated to fostering fair and
honest relationships between businesses and consumers, instilling consumer condence and contributing to
an ethical business environment."60 Particularly relevant to the topic at hand is the National Advertising
Division of the BBB, created in 1971. The National Advertising Division investigates complaints about
misleading advertising claims and determines whether such claims have been substantiated.61 The Division
is composed of advertising experts, and often examines ad copy, lab tests, technical reports, and consumer
surveys in deciding whether an advertisement is truthful and fair.62 \The truth and fairness of an advertising
claim can be challenged for a variety of reasons. For example, a claim may be blatantly false; a fact may be
presented in a misleading way; disclaimers may be inadequate...the veracity of a claim can depend on the
many shades of meaning that go with a certain phrase or word."63
The decisions of the National Advertising Division, which are accompanied by specic recommendations for
changes, are almost always adhered to by member companies. Companies who do not comply with Division
59About the Council of Better Business Bureaus, BBB Ocial Website (visited 04/10/01)
<http://www.bbb.org/about/aboutCouncil.asp>.
60Id.
61Id. Decisions may be reviewed by the National Advertising Review Board.
62Anthony Giorgianni, Advertising: An Arm of the Council of Better Business Bureaus Challenges the Commercial Claims
that Consumers or Competitors Don't Buy, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 7, 1997 at E5.
63Id.
18decisions lose their membership in the bureau, and lose the privileges associated with membership (includ-
ing signicant amounts of good publicity, legitimization, listing in BBB rosters, and consumer trust).64
Furthermore, the BBB will report companies who do not comply with National Advertising Division recom-
mendations to the Federal Trade Commission or the FDA.65 The newspapers are replete with stories of large
companies agreeing to change their ways after the National Advertising Division agreed with competitors
that their advertisements were false, misleading, confusing, or fraudulent.66
This route presents perhaps the best current alternative to strict FDA enforcement provisions, and best
makes an end-run around the problem of insucient FDA resources. This method does have some short-
comings. First, not all companies are members of the BBB, which means that its enforcement mechanisms
do not apply. Second, the BBB's enforcement mechanisms are limited. BBB membership is still a highly
coveted status, but its denial is certainly not the end of the world for the less reputable companies who are
employing these questionable practices. Third, a successful action with the BBB still involves substantial
expenditure by the prosecuting company, although much less that with more traditional litigation attacks.
A prosecuting company or consumer group must still prove that the advertisements or claims made by the
alleged violator are false or misleading. This often involves the preparation of substantial studies, reports,
and surveys, and a more dicult standard of proof than with the FDA.
g.
64Membership in the BBB carries over a 98% favorable name recognition according to a Gallup poll, and 74% of consumers
prefer doing business with a BBB member according to a Roper survey. See Benets of BBB Aliation, BBB Ocial Website
(visited 04/10/01) < http://www.bbb.org/bndsubpgs/bbbal.asp>.
65See Giorgianni.
66See Greg Winter, Fraudulent Marketers Capitalize On Demand for Sweat-Free Diets, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2000, Sec.
1, Pg. 1; Associated Press, Procter agrees to change Pampers ad claims, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 30, 1992 at Business 4
(reporting that Procter and Gamble had agreed to change slogans that disposable diapers were healthier than cloth after BBB
decision); Bloomberg Business News, Procter & Gamble agrees to alter Aleve ads, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution,
November 12, 1994 at C12 (reporting that Procter and Gamble agreed to change Alleve ads after BBB nding that they
misstated the qualities of competing painkillers); Anthony Giorgianni, Advertising: An Arm of the Council of Better Business
Bureaus Challenges the Commercial Claims that Consumers or Competitors Don't Buy, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 7, 1997 at
E5.
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The various methods and strategies aimed at leveling the playing eld and overcoming the problems caused
by insucient FDA resources have their place in our current scheme. They provide alternatives to total
regulation by a single entity, and provide for exibility, checks and balances, and self-regulation. Still,
these alternatives do not provide an adequate solution to the problem at hand, either individually or in
conjunction with one another. To one degree or another, each one of them involves added risk, expense,
delay, uncertainty, ineectiveness, or diculty which make them sub-optimal.
Part III. Increasing Compliance Without Increasing Resources: A Potential Solution
a. Introduction
In studying both the problem at hand and the inadequate solutions to it, a number of factors have emerged
that present themselves as prerequisites for a good solution. Any potential solution will have to t within
these prerequisites if it hopes to improve upon the status quo. First, a solution should come from within the
FDA. The FDA is in the best position to perform enforcement { they have the knowledge, experience, and
power to do so eectively. Solutions which attempt to circumvent the FDA have the inherent problems of
expense, risk, and illegitimacy. The FDA is able to regulate entire industries and among several industries
simultaneously. Second, a solution must be resource-ecient in two ways. A good solution should minimize
the resources required to undertake it. This is one main reason that the FDA should be involved in any good
solution { their power makes them the most ecient enforcer. Also, in order to be feasible a solution must
20operate within the reality of nite and extremely limited FDA funding. Third, a solution must discourage
the competitive rule-breaking cycle that has emerged in many industries while encouraging rule obeying and
violation reporting. Finally, a good solution should be driven by those aggrieved. In most cases, industries
will be economically harmed by unfair competitive practices and will be willing to press for enforcement
against violators. In some cases, consumers or groups of consumers will initiate proceedings. A good
solution should accommodate both groups.
b. The Basic Theory Behind the Solution
As we know, the main problem is one of enforcement. Inadequate funding and prioritized enforcement
lead to predictable holes in FDA attention and coverage. Less scrupulous players in competitive elds will
exploit those holes by violating FDA regulations, say by making fraudulent or untested statements, not
listing certain ingredients, violating safety standards, etc. These violations give a company a competitive
advantage over other members of an industry, either by reducing their costs of production, by increasing the
number of people who by their product, or by allowing them to inate their price. Faced with this situation,
a company must either follow suit and adopt similar rule-breaking behavior, or somehow get the violator to
cease its illegal actions. When these companies approach the FDA, the agency charged with enforcing these
rules, they are told that insucient resources prevent them from taking action. The rest of an industry,
left with only expensive, risky, and relatively less powerful remedies, often sinks to the level of the violator,
increasing fraud and deception to consumers.
The problem is not in getting the FDA to say what is or is not in violation of their regulations. The problem
is getting them to devote the resources to locating violators, pressing charges, having hearings, negotiating,
and occasionally litigating disputes. Even if the FDA is willing to take initial steps towards enforcing a
21regulation, they may not be able to press the matter in the face of industry resistance.67 How can we
decrease the number of violations without increasing FDA resources?
Basic deterrence theory provides some answers. Essentially, when contemplating an illegal act, an entity does
a simple analysis. They compare the benets gained from the act versus the costs, which are discounted by
the chances of getting caught. If you want to deter more criminal acts, you must either increase the severity
of the punishment, or make the transgressor realize that the chances of getting caught are greater, or both.68
The benets of violating minor FDA regulations can be immense, including increased sales, prots, and
market share. The chances of being caught are relatively small given the FDA's limited resources, and even
if the violator is caught, the penalties for minor infractions are usually fairly light. In many situations, then,
this simple cost-benet analysis leads companies to violate FDA regulations that are not heavily enforced,
and to err on the side of protability rather than compliance.
In addition to bolstering FDA resources so that they can go after more violators, I propose that the incentives
should be changed to stop violations before they become severe. I believe that there is room to alter the
costs and benets of rule breaking in order to deter more violations, and to convince violators to stop their
illicit actions before the FDA is required to bring their resources to bear upon them.
c. A Possible Solution
This proposed solution is rough { it is not intended to be a blueprint for reform, but rather a cluster of ideas
designed to stimulate reform discussions and idea exchange. The specic details included herein are provided
to give substance to my proposal, and are not presented as some ideal or \correct" method of implementing
67See David Kiley, FDA Siezes Citrus Hill, Brandweek, April 29, 1991 at 6 (describing that it was reasonable for P&G to
stop negotiating with the FDA because it was unlikely that they would take further steps to enforce the regulation).
68See generally Johannes Adenas, General Prevention { Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. Crim. L., Criminology and Police Science
176, 179-180; Sanford Kadish and Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and It's Processes, 6th ed. (Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1995),
115-119.
22these ideas. The backbone of this proposal is the notion that by increasing the penalties for willful violation
of FDA regulations, companies can be convinced to mend their ways.
At the request of an individual or company, the FDA could issue a preliminary opinion letter on the legality
or illegality of a particular claim or label. This letter would be sent to all companies or producers specied by
the party making the request. If the FDA's preliminary opinion is that the practice is illegal, each company
on notice (the requestor and each company specied by the requestor) must cease the practice within a set
time period, perhaps 60 days. This would allow all competing companies a reasonable amount of time to
exhaust warehoused products, and would force them to compete under the same set of rules. If they do not
comply with the opinion letter, the FDA does not immediately prosecute them. Rather, they are deemed
\willful violators" and are subject to multiplied penalties and intensied criminal liability if and when the
FDA chooses to crack down. If the FDA opinion letter states that the practice is legal, on the other hand,
the FDA is limited in its choice of remedies should they later decide to regulate the conduct. For example,
nes are reduced, and seizure and criminal penalties are not available.
This policy essentially increases the potential costs of rule violation. If the FDA acts against a violator
without any prior action, the violator receives a slap on the wrist. If the FDA acts against a violator after
warning them that their conduct violated a particular provision, they receive some greater punishment {
criminal liability, multiple damages, costs, etc. Fear of these repercussions will make more violators cease
their illicit activity after only a small resource allocation (composition of a warning letter) is made.
Deterrence theory also tells us that increasing penalties without increasing the likelihood of enforcement
(the chances of being caught) has only insignicant results.69 The doctrine also teaches that to increase
deterrence, one need not actually increase the chances of catching the illegal activity, but must merely make
potential transgressors feel that the chances are increased.70 For example, placing an empty police car on a
69See Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative Eects of Punishment, 114 U. Pa L. Rev. 949, 961-962 (1960).
70Sanford Kadish and Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and It's Processes, 6th ed. (Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1995), 117.
23highway will reduce speeding, even though the presence of the car does nothing to increase the chances of
catching speeders. With these principles in mind, as well as the limited resources available to the FDA, we
must design a method of increasing enforcement or the perceived likelihood of enforcement to properly deter
FDA violations.
I propose a system of complainant-paid fees to oset the costs of enforcement. If the FDA determines that
they do not have sucient resources to pursue a certain violation, a company, consumer, or group thereof
should be able to provide the funding needed to prompt FDA action. The amount of litigation in the area
clearly evidences that competitors and consumers groups are willing to spend money to obtain remedies. I
submit that in most cases, it would be more ecient to simply provide the resources to the FDA and have
them enforce the regulations, rather than to engage in protracted litigation. The implementation of user
fees associated with review of new drugs greatly increased the speed and eectiveness of FDA action in that
area. However, establishing this system will be tricky. Because user-fees would presumably only kick in once
the FDA has decided that they do not have the resources to attack a certain violation, there is a risk that
the FDA would be less willing to take on certain violations (because industry might pay for them if the FDA
does not). The system should contain some penalty-driven funding on the back end, as well. Increasing
penalties for willful violation could provide much of the additional funding needed to enforce the provisions.
These methods would make enforcement of every violation economically feasible. Once those in the industry
realize this, violations will become much more infrequent.
d.
Conclusion
This solution is not perfect. However, it appears that such a policy shift would substantially reduce the
24negative eects currently caused by the lack of adequate FDA resources.
This policy keeps enforcement of FDA guidelines in the hands of those best equipped to assess violations and
monitor compliance. Despite being under-funded, the FDA contains a huge body of expertise in food, drug,
and cosmetic regulation. Indeed, their expertise is one reason why courts provide such a poor alternative to
FDA enforcement { courts feel that it is not their position to second-guess the FDA. Keeping enforcement
of these regulations within the entity that is has been doing so since 1862 is advantageous.
This policy can work within existing budgetary constraints. Because substantial increases in funding are
unlikely given the current political and budgetary climate and the history of FDA funding, a solution will have
to be self-funding or extremely ecient. This solution is both. Increasing the severity of penalties will reduce
the number of violations with no increase in the expenditure of resources. Allowing for the complainants
to fund FDA investigation provides one source of funding for FDA enforcement, and the increases penalties
may provide another. Both competitors and consumer groups would be able to lodge complaints, so that
consumers can gain protection even if no one in the industry is willing to take the initiative. Furthermore,
complaining by members of industry will not be deterred as by uncertainty as it sometimes is under the
current regime.
This solution breaks the cycle of competitive rule-breaking. By increasing the costs of rule breaking, one
makes it less protable to acquire a competitive advantage via these improper means. By increasing the
frequency of enforcement, companies will realize that ultimately any attempt to circumvent FDA regulations
will be met with punitive measures. Once the honest members of an industry have a weapon with which to
decimate these methods of gaining competitive advantages, they have no need to \sink to the level" of their
less-honest counterparts. The playing eld will be level.
While no solution is perfect, I hope that at the very least this paper has demonstrated that there are solutions
to the problem of inadequate FDA resources. As funding for various important agencies shrinks relative to
25their duties, innovation will be required to stretch what few resources there are as far as possible. The
recommendations of this paper, if implemented properly, would signicantly reduce the problems associated
with incomplete FDA enforcement of its regulations.
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